[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and misstatements.]
[Footnote 2: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called Nyayakos'a has been prepared by M.M. Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.]
[Footnote 3: New York, 1914, p. 3.]
[Footnote 4: Pa@nini, III. iii. 94.]
[Footnote 5: A.A. Macdonell's _History of Sanskrit Literature_, p. 31.]
[Footnote 6: Weber (_Hist. Ind. Lit_., p. 11, note) says that the word Brahma@na signifies "that which relates to prayer _brahman_." Max Muller (_S.B.E._, I.p. lxvi) says that Brahma@na meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p. xxii) says that the Brhama@nas were so called "probably either because they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests." But in view of the fact that the Brahma@nas were also supposed to be as much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view is the correct one.]
[Footnote 7: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.]
[Footnote 8: _Ibid_. p. 18.]
[Footnote 9: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 26.]
[Footnote 10: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 35.]
[Footnote 11: _Ibid_, p. 38.]
[Footnote 12: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 27.]
[Footnote 13: See _Ibid._ p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other references to Henotheism.]
[Footnote 14: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 16, 17.]
[Footnote 15: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17.]
[Footnote 16: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.]
[Footnote 17: See _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.]
[Footnote 18: Kaegi's translation.]
[Footnote 19: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Brahmana _S.B.E._ vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.]
[Footnote 20: See _S.B.E._ XLIII. pp.59,60,400 and XLIV. p.409.]
[Footnote 21: See _Ibid_., XLIV, p. 418.]
[Footnote 22: R.V.x.90, Puru@sa Sukta.]
[Footnote 23: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]
[Footnote 24: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]
[Footnote 25: R.V.x. 81. 4.]
[Footnote 26: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.]
[Footnote 27: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11; also R.V. II. 15 and IV.
[Footnote 28: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 90. R.V.x. 129.]
[Footnote 29: See Eggeling's translation of _S'.B., S.B.E._ vol. XLIII. pp.
[Footnote 30: See _S.B._ I. 9.3, and also Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 166, 167.]
[Footnote 31: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]
[Footnote 32: R.V.i. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Atman in _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_.
[Footnote 33: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by the "Nir@naya-Sagara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Isa, 2 Kena,
[Footnote 34: This is what is called the difference of fitness (_adhikaribheda_). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.]
[Footnote 35: When the Sa@mhita texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brahma@nas. These however were gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brahma@nas even of the same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name of particular S'akhas (e.g. Aitareya, Kau@sitaki) with which the Brahma@nas were associated or named. According to the divergence of the Brahma@nas of the different S'akhas there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upani@sads associated with them.]
[Footnote 36: Garbha Upani@sad, Atman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc. There were however some exceptions such as the Ma@n@dukya, Jabala, Pai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc.]
[Footnote 37: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17. Hira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvahammani Hira@nyagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word Brahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]
[Footnote 38: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]
[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p, 7.]
[Footnote 40: _Ibid._ pp. 16, 17.]
[Footnote 41: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]
[Footnote 42: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 68.]
[Footnote 43: _Ibid._ p. 78.
[Footnote 44: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 74.]
[Footnote 45: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yajnavalkya speaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidya_.]
[Footnote 46: Winternitz's _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I. pp. 197 ff.]
[Footnote 47: The story of Maitryi and Yajnavalikya (B@rh. II. 4) and that of Satyakama son of Jabala and his teacher (Cha. IV. 4).]
[Footnote 48: Cha. V. II.]
[Footnote 49: Ait. Ara@n. II 1-3.]
[Footnote 50: Keith's _Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka_.]
[Footnote 51: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, _E.R.E._.]
[Footnote 52: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]
[Footnote 53: Max Muller's _Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E._ vol. I.p. lxxxi.]
[Footnote 54: _S. B.E._ vol. I, p lxxxi.]
[Footnote 55: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]
[Footnote 56: Deussen supposes that Kausitaki is also one of the earliest. Max Mueller and Schroeder think that Maitray@ani also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In the first period he includes B@rhadara@nyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Kausitaki and Kena. In that second he includes Ka@thaka, Is'a, S'vetas'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahanarayana, and in the third period he includes Pras'na, Maitraya@ni and Man@dukya. The rest of the Upani@sads he includes in the fourth period.]
[Footnote 57: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]
[Footnote 58: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada (-_S.B.E._ I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour."]
[Footnote 59: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.
[Footnote 60: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all misinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced; it is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword.]
[Footnote 61: Ka@tha III. 15.]
[Footnote 62: Sa@nkara on _Brahmasutra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156.]
[Footnote 63: Taitt. II. 7.]
[Footnote 64: Cha. VIII. 7. 1.]
[Footnote 65: Cha. VIII. 7-12.]
[Footnote 66: Cha. III. 14. 4.]
[Footnote 67: _Ibid._ VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]
[Footnote 68: Cha. VI. 10.]
[Footnote 69: Deussen's translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 164.]
[Footnote 70: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]
[Footnote 71: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]
[Footnote 72: Cha. VI.11.]
[Footnote 73: _ibid._ VI.2,3,4.]
[Footnote 74: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201.]
[Footnote 75: Cha. VI. 2-4.]
[Footnote 76: Cha. V. 10.]
[Footnote 77: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335.]
[Footnote 78: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds.]
[Footnote 79: See also Kau@sitaki, II. 15.]
[Footnote 80: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352.]
[Footnote 81: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]
[Footnote 82: I have preferred to spell Di@nnaga after Vacaspati's _Tatparyatika_ (p. I) and not Dignnaga as it is generally spelt.]
[Footnote 83: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]
[Footnote 84: _Brahmajala-sutta, Digha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]
[Footnote 85: The word "_dars'ana_" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika sutras_ of Ka@nada (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "_ditthi_" (Sanskrit--dr@sti from the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (_sarvadars'anavacyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense ("_Yadi nama dars'ane dars'ane nanaprakaram sattvatak-@sanam uktamasti._" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts_, p.20). Madhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, _Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word "_mata_" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views "_tairthika._" The words "siddha," "_jnanin_," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]
[Footnote 86: There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "_Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaraktam_" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of two combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunauktam_ (said by the particle _tu_) and _tatrapi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not said also there) and _tatra apina uktam_ (said there by the particle _api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_ and so it is indicated twice." Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]
[Footnote 87: S'vetas'vatara, I. 2, _kala@h svabhabo niyatiryad@rccha bhutani yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam._]
[Footnote 88: Lokayata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokayatas.]
[Footnote 89: _Samannaphala-sutta_, _Digha_, II. 20. Hoernle's article on the Ajivakas, E.R.E.]
[Footnote 90: _Samannaphala-sutta_, II. 23.]
[Footnote 91: _Mahaparinibbanasuttanta_, _Digha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]
[Footnote 92: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasalini_, p. 25.]
[Footnote 93: Oldenberg's _Dipava@msa_, p. 31.]
[Footnote 94: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the _Sa@myutta Nikaya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.]
[Footnote 95: _Atthasatini_, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as _dhamma-desana_ where it means religious teaching. The _La@nkavatara_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyapurvaka dharmma_, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]
[Footnote 96: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakirtti in his _Madhyamika v@rtti,_ p. 565 (La Vallee Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthapayali kayena vaca manasa ca_).]
[Footnote 97: _Atthasalini_, p. 385, upadanantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakirtti in explaining upadana says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastuni sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanaya vi@dhapanaya upadanamupadatte tatra tatra prarthayate_). _Madhyamika v@rtti_, p. 565.]
[Footnote 98: Candrakirtti describes t@r@s@na as _asvadanabhinandanadhyavasanasthanadatmapriyarupairviyogo ma bhut, nityamaparityago bhavediti, yeyam prarthana_--the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. _Ibid._ 565.]
[Footnote 99: We read also of phassayatana and phassakaya. _M. N._ II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakirtti says that _@sa@dbhirayatanadvarai@h k@rtyaprak@riya@h pravarttante prajnayante. tannamarupapratyaya@m
@sa@dayatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`cayatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akaya@h pravarttante. M.V._ 565.]
[Footnote 100: Ayatana means the six senses together with their objects. Ayatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@layatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candrakirtti has _ayatanadvarai@h_.]
[Footnote 101: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering namarupa as mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nama in each birth. These together with rupa (matter) give us namarupa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's bhasya on the _Brahma sutras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarupa which may probably refer to the Vijnanavada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijnana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rupa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum while rupa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijnana entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through the association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijnana into the womb compare _D N_ II. 63.]
[Footnote 102: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. p. 87, "_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action. Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhata khandha (viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhata khandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty _cittasamprayuktasa@mskara_, it also counts thirteen _cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]
[Footnote 103: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8.]
[Footnote 104: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jati (birth). _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhasya counted all the terms from jara, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]
[Footnote 105: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyaya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]
[Footnote 106: The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Cha. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9.
[Footnote 107: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Panha_ (628).]
[Footnote 108: _Atthasalini_, p. 112...]
[Footnote 109: _Ibid._ p. 113, _Yatha hi rupadini upadaya pannatta suriyadayo na atthato rupadihi anne honti ten' eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa teja-sa@nkhatam rupa@m piti eva@m vuccamane pi na rupadihi anno suriyo nama atthi. Tatha cittam phassadayo dhamme upadaya pannapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi annam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva tasmin samaye phassadihi atthato annad eva hoti ti_.]
[Footnote 110: "_Jatirdehajanma pancaskandhasamudaya@h,_" Govindananda's _Ratnaprabha_ on S'a@nkara's bha@sya, II. ii. 19.]
[Footnote 111: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabha_ on S'a@nkara's bha@sya, II. ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (_dharmadi_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "_kammabhava_" or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]
[Footnote 112: Prof. De la Vallee Poussin in his _Theoric des Douze Causes_, p. 26, says that _S'alistambhasutra_ explains the word "upadana" as "t@r@s@navaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@na and Candrakirtti also gives the same meaning, _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdananda explains "upadana" as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@na (desire), i.e. the active tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upadana means "support" it would denote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _upadanam pancaskandhalak@sa@nam...pancopadanaskandhakhyam upadanam. M.V._ XXVII. 6.]
[Footnote 113: Poussin's _Theorie des Douze Causes_, p. 23.
[Footnote 114: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your resolution, 'May I be a cakravartti king in a next existence,'" _Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]
[Footnote 115: "_sa cedanandavijnana@m matu@hkuk@sim navakrameta, na tat kalalam kalalatvaya sannivartteta_," _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka, S'arira_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapiduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]
[Footnote 116: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from _Digha_, II. 63, "si le vijnana ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindananda on S'a@nkara's commentary on the _Brahma-sutras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijnana) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskaras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (_kalala-budbudavastha_} is produced.]
[Footnote 117: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilasini_ on _Mahanidana suttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as tri@ka@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sa pratityasamutpado dvadas'a@ngastrika@n@daka@h purvaparantayordve dve madhye@s@tau_."]
[Footnote 118: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]
[Footnote 119: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijja and sa@nkhara have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond."]
[Footnote 120: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]
[Footnote 121: See _Pa@tisambhidamagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima Nikaya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhara...avijjanidana avijjasamudaya avijjajatika avijjapabhava_.]
[Footnote 122: In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of avidya (_pancaparvi avidya_).]
[Footnote 123: The word skandha is used in Chandogya, II. 23 (_trayo dharmaskandha@h yajna@h adhyayanam danam_) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitri, VII. II.]
[Footnote 124: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III. 86, etc.]
[Footnote 125: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]
[Footnote 126: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]
[Footnote 127: _Atthasalini_, p. 299.]
[Footnote 128: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III. 86.]
[Footnote 129: _Khandhayamaka_.]
[Footnote 130: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]
[Footnote 131: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]
[Footnote 132: _Atthasalini_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]
[Footnote 133: _Atthasalini_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]
[Footnote 134: _Ibid._ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]
[Footnote 135: _Samyutta Nikaya_, III. 130.]
[Footnote 136: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap. XVII.), p. 175.]
[Footnote 137: _M. N._ I.p. 54. Childers translates "asava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "asava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the meaning that he gives to it is "_cira parivasika@t@thena_" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "asavas" so these are also called asavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called asava on account of their producing sa@msaradukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthasalini_, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina asrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]
[Footnote 138: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195.]
[Footnote 139: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasalini_, p. 371.]
[Footnote 140: _Dhammasa@nga@ni,_ p. 180.]
[Footnote 141: _Visuddhimagga Nidanadikatha_.]
[Footnote 142: _Visuddhimagga-silaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8.]
[Footnote 143: _Visuddhimagga_, II.]
[Footnote 144: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85.]
[Footnote 145: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhana (Skr. _dhyana_) with its accessory stages called parikammas (_Visuddhimagga,_ pp. 85 f.).]
[Footnote 146: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "_Iman ca pana ahare pa@tikulasanna@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no rasata@nhaya cittam pa@tiliyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so, kantaranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado ahara@m ahareti yavad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthaya_," p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.]
[Footnote 147: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370.]
[Footnote 148: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294.]
[Footnote 149: _Visuddhimagga,_ VI.]
[Footnote 150: _Ibid._ pp. 239-266.]
[Footnote 151: _Ibid._ pp. 266-292.]
[Footnote 152: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314.]
[Footnote 153: _Ibid._ pp. 314-315.]
[Footnote 154: Where there is piti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be piti. _Visuddhimagga_, p. 145.]
[Footnote 155: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163.]
[Footnote 156: _Majjhima Nikaya_, I.p. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp.
[Footnote 157: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 158: _Ibid._ pp. 216-217.]
[Footnote 159: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 340.]
[Footnote 160: _Ibid._ p. 341.]
[Footnote 161: _Ibid._ p. 341.]
[Footnote 162: See _Kathavatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp,
[Footnote 163: Tait, II.5.]
[Footnote 164: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]
[Footnote 165: _Sa@myutta Nikuya_, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]
[Footnote 166: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chandogya, VIII. 7-12.]
[Footnote 167: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45.]
[Footnote 168: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 46.]
[Footnote 169: _Majjhima Nikaya_, I.p. 54.]
[Footnote 170: Cha. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where vidya and avidya have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, I's'a 9-11.]
[Footnote 171: _A@ng. Nikaya_, III. 85.]
[Footnote 172 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap. XVII.), p. 175.]
[Footnote 173: The _Mahava@msa_ differs from _Dipava@msa_ in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahasa@nghikas, but it was the Mahasa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The _Mahabodhiva@msa_, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.--1000 A.D., follows the Mahava@msa in holding the Mahasa@nghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.
Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pa@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kathavatthu_ by Mrs Rhys Davids.]
[Footnote 174: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids's translation of _Kathavatthu_, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]
[Footnote 175: Madhavacarya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II.
_S'astradipika_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalananda's commentary (on _Bhamati_) _Vedantakalpataru_, p 286. "_vaibha@sikasya bahyo'rtha@h pratyak@sa@h, sautrantikasya jnanagatakaravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantikas is shown thus by Amalananda (1247-1260 A.D.) "_ye yasmin satyapi kadacitka@h te tadatiriktapek@sa@h_" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)
_Vedantakalpataru_, p. 289.]
[Footnote 176: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadipika_, pp. 46-47.]
[Footnote 177: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]
[Footnote 178: This account is based on the translation of _A@s@tamakos'asthananibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, _Bulletin de l' Academie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]
[Footnote 179: Professor De la Vallee Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitiyas in the _E. R.E._ He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyakhya_ the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibha@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarabhava_; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (_tyaganvaya_) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (_paribhoganvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallee Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have noticed above.]
[Footnote 180: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathavatthu_, p. xix, and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]
[Footnote 181: _Mahavyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz. Mulasarvastivada and Aryyasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.]
[Footnote 182: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibha@sas which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibha@sa texts dated 383 A.D.]
[Footnote 183: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]
[Footnote 184: The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibha@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapi@taka.]
[Footnote 185: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta University.]
[Footnote 186: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his bha@sya on the _Brahma-sutras_ II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]
[Footnote 187: Sogen's quotation from Kumarajiva's Chinese version of Aryyadeva's commentary on the _Madhyamika s'astra_ (chapter XX. Karika 9).]
[Footnote 188: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hinayana thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]
[Footnote 189: Quotations and references to many of these sutras are found in Candrakirtti's commentary on the _Madhyamika karikas_ of Nagarjuna; some of these are the following: _A@s@tasahasrikaprajnaparamita_ (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasahasrikaprajnaparamita, Gaganaganja, Samadhisutra, Tathagataguhyasutra, D@r@dhadhyas'ayasancodanasutra, Dhyayitamu@s@tisutra, Pitaputrasamagamasutra, Mahayanasutra, Maradamanasutra, Ratnaku@tasutra, Ratnacu@daparip@rcchasutra, Ratnameghasutra, Ratnaras`isutra, Ratnakarasutra, Ra@s@trapalaparip@rcchasutra, La@nkavatarasutra, Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikasutra, Vimalakirttinirdes'asutra, S'alistambhasutra, Samadhirajasutra, Sukhavativyuha, Suvar@naprabhasasutra, Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitayurdhyanasutra, Hastikakhyasutra, etc.]
[Footnote 190: The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajnaparamita_, pp. 24, 319; _Samadhirajasutra_, p. 1; _Karu@napu@ndarika_, p. 67; _La@nkavatarasutra_, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yana is as old as the Upani@sads where we read of Devayana and Pit@ryana. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkavatara_ of S'ravakayana (career of the S'ravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods), Brahmayana (career of becoming a Brahma), Tathagatayana (career of a Tathagata). In one place _Lankavatara_ says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankavatara_, p. 68).]
[Footnote 191: _A@s@tesahasiihaprajnaparamita_, p. 16.]
[Footnote 192: Ibid p. 177.]
[Footnote 193: Ibid p. 21.]
[Footnote 194: Ibid p. 177.]
[Footnote 195: Dr S.C. Vidyabhushana thinks that _Lankavatana_ belongs to about 300 A.D.]
[Footnote 196: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," _J.R.A.S_. 1905.]
[Footnote 197: Aryyadeva's _Hastabalaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ were published by Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada s'astri in the Bengal Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]
[Footnote 198: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of _S'raddhotpadas`astra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]
[Footnote 199: Taranatha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nagarjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote the _Buddhacaritakavya_, of great poetical excellence, and the _Mahala@mkaras'astra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical instrument called Rastavara that he might by that means convert the people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]
[Footnote 200: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vasana in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the sense of vasana is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as _La@nkavatara_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]
[Footnote 201: Compare Chandogya, VI. 1. 4.]
[Footnote 202: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]
[Footnote 203: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpada S'astra_, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]
[Footnote 204: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]
[Footnote 205: _Ibid_. pp. 93-100.]
[Footnote 206: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]
[Footnote 207: _Ibid_. p. 194.]
[Footnote 208: _Ibid_. pp.162 and 201.]
[Footnote 209: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]
[Footnote 210: _Ibid._ pp. 209-211, quoted from _Salistambhasutra_. Vacaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bhamati_ on S'a@nkara's _Brahma-sutra_.]
[Footnote 211: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 160.]
[Footnote 212: _Lankavatarasutra_, pp. 21-22.]
[Footnote 213 _Ibid._ p. 44.]
[Footnote 214: _Pancavatarasutra_, p. 44.]
[Footnote 215: _Ibid_., pp. 50-55.]
[Footnote 216: Asa@nga's _Mahayanasutrala@mkara_, pp. 58-59.]
[Footnote 217: Asa@nga's _Mahayanasutrala@mkara_, p. 65.]
[Footnote 218: _Lankavatarasutra_, p. 70.]
[Footnote 219: _Ibid._ p. 78.]
[Footnote 220: _Ibid._ p. 80.]
[Footnote 221: _Ibid._ pp. 80-81.]
[Footnote 222: _La@nkavatarasutra_, p. 85.]
[Footnote 223: _Lankavatarasutra_, p. 87, compare the term "vyavaharika" as used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by S'a@nkara.]
[Footnote 224: _La@nkavatarasutra_, p. 80.
[Footnote 225: _Lankavatarasutra_, p. 100.]
[Footnote 226: _Ibid._ p. 109.]
[Footnote 227: This account of the Vijnanavada school is collected mainly from _Lankavatarasutra_, as no other authentic work of the Vijnanavada school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka varttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya, II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mahayanasutralamkara_ deals more with the duties concerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysics of the system.]
[Footnote 228: Dharmakirtti calls himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his _Santanantarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Nyayabindu_ seems rightly to have been considered by the author of _Nyayabindu@tika@tippani_ (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika point of view.]
[Footnote 229: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of _Nyayaybindu_, Vinitadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in _Nyayabindu@tikatippani_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutika_ of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.]
[Footnote 230: _Nyayabindu@tika@tippani_, p. 11.]
[Footnote 231: The definition first given in the _Pramanasamucaya_ (not available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnaga (500 A.D.) was "_Kalpanapodham_." According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa jnana_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (_savikalpa jnana_), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.]
[Footnote 232: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the _Nyayabindu, Nyayabindu@tika, Nyayabindu@tika@tippani_ (St Petersburg,
[Footnote 233: As the _Prama@nasamuccaya_ of Dinnaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the _Nyayabindu@tika_ of Dharmmottara.]
[Footnote 234: _tasmat niyamavatorevanvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h yena pratibandho gamyeta sadhanyasa sadhyena. Nyayabindu@tika_, p. 24.]
[Footnote 235: _na hi yo yatra svabhavena na pratibaddha@h sa tam apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyama. Nyayabindu@tika_, p. 29.]
[Footnote 236: The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in those cases where the sadhya oc probandum existed), and (3) vipak@sasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.]
[Footnote 237: See introduction to the translation of _Kathavatthu_ (_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]
[Footnote 238: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly (_Nyayamanjari_, p. 22):
"_mulak@satikarimahuranavastham hi du@sa@nam. mulasiddhau tvarucyapi nanavastha nivaryate._"
The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.]
[Footnote 239: See pratyabhijnanirasa of the Buddhists, _Nyayamanjari_, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc.]
[Footnote 240: See _Tarkarahasyadipika_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also _Nyayamanjari,_ V.S. edition, p. 450.]
[Footnote 241: Compare _Milindapanha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]
[Footnote 242: Compare _Tarkarahasyadipika_ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and _Nyayamanjari,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnakirtti in _Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts_.]
[Footnote 243: This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnakirtti as well as in Nyaya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "_arthakriyasiddhi_" meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m darupakadi tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later _arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects (_heyopadeyarthavi@saya_). But with Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) the word _arthakriyakaritva_ has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence _sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_ pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as _arthakriyakaritva_ (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakirtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva_ they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakirtti's sense.]
[Footnote 244: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]
[Footnote 245: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and Buhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura," in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 246: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 247: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]
[Footnote 248: _Aupapatika, Rajapras'niya, Jivabhigama, Prajnapana, Jambudvipaprajnapti, Candraprajnapti, Suryaprajnapti, Nirayavali, Kalpavata@msika, Pu@spika, Pu@spaculika, V@r@s@nida@sas_.]
[Footnote 249: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstara, Aturapratyakhyana, Bhaktaparijna, Ta@ndulavaiyali, Ca@n@davija, Devendrastava, Ga@nivija, Mahapratyakhyana, Virastava_.]
[Footnote 250: _Nis'itha, Mahanis'itha, Vyavahara, Das'as'rutaskandha, B@rhatkalpa, Pancakalpa_.]
[Footnote 251: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 252: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]
[Footnote 253: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]
[Footnote 254: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]
[Footnote 255: See Hoernle's translation of _Uvasagadasao_, Jacobi, _loc. cit_., and Hoernle's article on the Ajivakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetambaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later.]
[Footnote 256: See Chandogya, VI. 1.]
[Footnote 257: See _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]
[Footnote 258: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.
[Footnote 259: _Syadvadama@njari_, pp. 171-173.]
[Footnote 260: The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya, samabhiru@dha-naya_, and _evambhula-naya_. See _Vis'e@savas'yaka bha@sya_, pp. 895-923.]
[Footnote 261: See _Vis'e@savas'yaka bha@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and _Syadvadamanjari_, pp. 170, etc.]
[Footnote 262: See _Syadvadamanjari_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166, etc.]
[Footnote 263: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and saptabha@ngi probably occurs in Bhadrabahu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary _Sutrak@rtanganiryukti_.
[Footnote 264: See _Prama@na-naya-tattvalokala@mkara_ (Benares), p. 16; also _Parik@sa-mukha-suira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]
[Footnote 265: _Prama@na-naya-tattvalokala@mkara,_ p. 26.]
[Footnote 266: See _Pari@sa-mukha-sutra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the concluding v@rtti of ch. II.]
[Footnote 267: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called _satkhyati_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].
[Footnote 268: See _Jaina-tarka-varttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti by S'antyacarya, Prama@nanayatattvalokala@mkara, ch. I., _Pariksa-mukha-sutra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]
[Footnote 269: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu atma ca indriyam...anupahatacak@suradides'e@su eva atmana@h karmak@sayopas'amaslenasthagitagavak@satulyani cak@suradini upakara@nani. Jaina-Vattika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See _Prama@namima@msa._ See also _Tattvartha-dhigamasutra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which as observing it is removed.]
[Footnote 270 _Prameyakamalamarta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]
[Footnote 271: As regards concomitance (_vyapti_) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyapti_ (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svarthanumana for one's own self and _pararthanumana_ for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Das'avaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) _Pratijna_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijnavibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_ (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins),
(6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) _D@r@s@anta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects),
(8) _As'a@nka (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) _As'a@nkaprati@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_ (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhu@sa@na's _Indian Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his _Nyayasutrabha@sya_, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]
[Footnote 272: See _Jainatarkavarttika_, and _Parik@samukhasutrav@rtti_, and _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]
[Footnote 273: _Prameyakamalamarta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]
[Footnote 274: See _Jaina Varttika,_ p. 60.]
[Footnote 275: See _Prameyakamalamarta@nda,_ p. 33.]
[Footnote 276: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jnana_. Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jnana means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and then jnana. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]
[Footnote 277: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._, and _Lokaprakas'a_, VI. pp. 31 ff.]
[Footnote 278: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matijnana_ (ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernatural cognition), (4) _mana@hparyaya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-jnana_ (omniscience).]
[Footnote 279: The stages through which a developing soul passes are technically called _gu@nasthanas_ which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation (see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse).]
[Footnote 280: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29.]
[Footnote 281: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, edited by S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]
[Footnote 282: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30.]
[Footnote 283: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamanapura@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by Ghoshal.]
[Footnote 284: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]
[Footnote 285: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 286: Nemicandra, 33.]
[Footnote 287: _Varddhama@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_ S'I. 35.]
[Footnote 288: _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_.]
[Footnote 289: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 290: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]
[Footnote 291: See _Prameyakamalamarta@n@da_, pp. 136-143; _Jainatarkavarttika_, p. 106.]
[Footnote 292: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]
[Footnote 293: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]
[Footnote 294: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are: _Iryya_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), _bhasa_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all beings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), _danasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_ (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), _vaggupti_ (absolute silence), and _kayagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]
[Footnote 295:_Yogas'astra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in _Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874, and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]
[Footnote 296: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadipika_.]
[Footnote 297: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp.
[Footnote 298: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published by the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]
[Footnote 299: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mima@msa of Kumarila and Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]
[Footnote 300: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva._ But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva_.]
[Footnote 301: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]
[Footnote 302: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]
[Footnote 303: I suppose that Raja's commentary on the _Karika_ was the same as _Rajavarttika_ quoted by Vacaspati. Raja's commentary on the _Karika_ has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyayamanjari_, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.]
[Footnote 304: Readers unacquainted with Sa@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.]
[Footnote 305: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapa@ni, the commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktancodasina@m puru@samavyaktatvasadharmyat avyaktayam prak@rtaveva prak@sipya avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nati._ Harinatha Vis'arada's edition of _Caraka, S'arira_, p. 4.]
[Footnote 306: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having eight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhatuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat, aha@mkara, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]
[Footnote 307: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapa@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapa@ni on s'arira, I. 46.]
[Footnote 308: Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_), resembling Nagarjuna's Nirva@na. Thus Caraka writes:--_tasmi@ms'caramasannyase samulah@hsarvavedana@h asa@mjnajnanavijnana niv@rtti@m yantyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhavebhya@h cihna@m yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavida@m brahma taccak@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S'arira_ 1. 98-100.]
[Footnote 309: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:
(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,
(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.]
[Footnote 310: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pancas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sa@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sa@mkhya doctrines sketched in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]
[Footnote 311: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 99.]
[Footnote 312: A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gu@naratna (_Tarkarahasyadipika,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]
[Footnote 313: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]
[Footnote 314: Takakusu's "A study of Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," _J. R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Is'varak@r@s@na and Vindhyavasin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadipika,_ pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Is'varak@r@s@na. It appears that Is'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sa@mkhya karika_ and another an independent work on Sa@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:
"_Pratiniyatadhyavasaya@h s'rotradisamuttha adhyak@sam_" (p. 108).
If Vacaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumana in his _Tattvakaumudi_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sa@mkhya karika_ then Is'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavasin whose views on anumana as referred to in _S'lokavarttika,_ p. 393, are altogether different. But Vacaspati's own statement in the _Tatparyya@tika_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.]
[Footnote 315: Patanjali's Mahabha@sya, IV. I. 3.
_Atisannikar@sadativiprakar@sat murttyantaravyavadhanat tamasav@rtatvat indriyadaurvalyadatipramadat,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]
[Footnote 316: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita,_ pp. 108, 110.]
[Footnote 317: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs, and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karika_ of Is'varakr@sna, but I have omitted them in my account of Samkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo, moha, mahamoha, tamisra_, and _andhatamisra_. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhagya_), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (_parapara_), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (_anuttamambhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others (_uttamambhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of scriptures (_tara_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutara_),
(3) proper reasoning (_taratara_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (_sadamudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamana lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Sa@mkhya goal.]
[Footnote 318: _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 109.]
[Footnote 319: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam prahah s'ariramth manavah sa@mkhyam sa@mkhyatmakatvacca kapiladibhirucyate. Matsyapurana_, IV. 28.]
[Footnote 320: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.]
[Footnote 321: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]
[Footnote 322: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.
[Footnote 323: Vatsyayana, however, in his bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, I. i 29, distinguishes Sa@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sa@mkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (_niratis'aya@h cetana@h_). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa. Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyasabha@sya,_ It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Sa@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sa@mkhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika._" Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a passage from _Vyasabha@sya,_ III. 13, in his bha@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]
[Footnote 324: The Yoga writer Jaigi@savya wrote "_Dharanas'astra_" which dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patanjali. He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati's _Tatparya@tika_ or Vatsyayana's bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, III. ii. 43.]
[Footnote 325: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]
[Footnote 326: Patanjali's _Mahabha@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]
[Footnote 327: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadaprama@nakam tada kim syat_ (IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyasabha@sya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as sutra.]
[Footnote 328: Cf. _Yoga sutra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sutras_ speak of Is'vara (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyasa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the _Yoga sutras_ of the existence of God.]
[Footnote 329: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]
[Footnote 330: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sa@mkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]
[Footnote 331: Cf. the account of _Pas'upatadars'ana_ in _Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_.]
[Footnote 332: _pra@nayamah pratyaharah dhyanam dhara@na tarkah samadhih sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]
[Footnote 333: _Yoga sutra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathacikitsas'astra@m caturvyuha@m rogo rogahetuh arogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi s'astram caturvyuhameva; tadyatha sa@msara@h, sa@msarahetu@h mok@sa@h mok@sopaya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msaro heya@h, pradhanapuru@sayo@h sa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyatyantiki niv@rttirhana@m hanopaya@h samyagdar`sanam, Vyasabha@sya_, II. 15]
[Footnote 334: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 357].]
[Footnote 335: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patanjalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _spho@ta_ which was denied even by Sa@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my _Study of Patanjali_, Appendix I.]
[Footnote 336: _Karika_, 18.]
[Footnote 337: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradipika,_ IV.]
[Footnote 338: _Tattakaumudi_ 5; _Yogavarttika_, IV. 22; _Vijnanam@rtabha@sya_, p. 74; _Yogavarttika_ and _Tattvavais'aradi_, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyasabha@sya,_ I. 6, 7.]
[Footnote 339: It is important to note that Sa@mkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]
[Footnote 340: _Karika_, 12, with Gau@dpada and Naraya@natirtha.]
[Footnote 341: _Yogavarttika_, II. 18; Bhavaga@nes'a's _Tattvayatharthyadipana_, pp. 1-3; _Vijnanam@rtabha@sya_, p. 100; _Tattvakaumudi_, 13; also Gau@dapada and Naraya@natirtha, 13.]
[Footnote 342: _Yogavarttika,_ II. 19, and _Pravacanabha@sya,_ I. 61.]
[Footnote 343: _Kaumudi_ 13-16; _Tattvavais'aradi_ II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also _Yogavarttika,_ IV. 13,14.]
[Footnote 344: Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_,
[Footnote 345: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the disturbance of the equilibrium of prak@rti for new creation takes place by the will of Is'vara (God).]
[Footnote 346: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given in Ray's _Hindu Chemistry._ The credit of explaining Sa@mkhya physics, in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.]
[Footnote 347: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
[Footnote 348: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
[Footnote 349: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmatras and atoms were explained in literatures other than Sa@mkhya; for some account of it see Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_.]
[Footnote 350: Dr B.N. Seal in describing this akas'a says "Akas'a corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray's _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 88.]
[Footnote 351: _Vyasabha@sya_ and _Yogavarttika_, IV. 3; _Tattvavais'aradi_, IV. 3.]
[Footnote 352: Ray, _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 72.]
[Footnote 353: _Ibid._ p. 73.]
[Footnote 354: _Vyasabha@sya, Tattvavais'aradi_ and _Yogavarttika,_ III. 14.]
[Footnote 355: It is well to note in this connection that Sa@mkhya-yoga does not admit the existence of time as an independent entity like the Nyaya-Vais'e@sika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind (_buddhi-nirma@na_). The time required by an atom to move its own measure of space is called a moment (_k@sa@na_) or one unit of time. Vijnana Bhik@su regards one unit movement of the gu@nas or reals as a moment. When by true wisdom the gu@nas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish. _Vyasabha@sya, Tattvavais'aradi_, and _Yogavarttika_, III. 52 and III. 13.]
[Footnote 356: _Tattvakaumudi,_ 9.]
[Footnote 357: Both the Vedanta and the Sa@mkhya theories of causation are sometimes loosely called _satkaryyavada._ But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedanta theory of causation should be called satkara@navada for according to it the _kara@na_ (cause) alone exists (_sat_) and all _karyyas,_ (effects) are illusory appearances of the kara@na; but according to Sa@mkhya the karyya exists in a potential state in the kara@na and is hence always existing and real.]
[Footnote 358: _Tattvavais'aradi,_ IV. 3; _Yogavarttika,_ I. 24; and _Pravavanabhasya,_ V. 1-12.]
[Footnote 359: _Tattvavais'aradi_ and _Yogavarttika_, I. 4.]
[Footnote 360: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Sa@mkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it is therefore called the _akhyati_ (non-apprehension) theory of illusion which must be distinguished from the _anyathakhyati_ (misapprehension) theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). _Yogavarttika,_ I. 8.]
[Footnote 361: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they are reflected, like trees in a lake
"_tasmims'ca darpane sphare samasta vastudrstayah
imastah pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumah_" _Yogavarttika_, I. 4.
The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the external objects and assumes their forms: "_indriyanyeva pranalika cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadvara bahyavastusuparaktasya cittasyendryasahityenaivarthakarah parinamo bhavati_" _Yogavarttika_, I. VI. 7. Contrast _Tattvakaumudi_, 27 and 30.]
[Footnote 362: The word sa@mskara is used by Pa@nini who probably preceded Buddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality (_Sata utkar@sadhana@m sa@mskara@h_, Kas'ila on Pa@nini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and (3) adornment (Pa@nini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the word sa@nkhara is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkhara stands for almost anything of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of aggregation (_samavaya_ of Pa@nini) is prominent. The word _sa@mskaroti_ is used in Kau@sitaki, II. 6, Chandogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and B@rhadara@nyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of sa@mskara in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means the impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word vasana (_Yoga sutra_, IV. 24) seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanis@sads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pali pi@takas. _Abhidhanappadipika_ of Moggallana mentions it, and it occurs in the Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root "_vas_" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of sa@mskara, and in _Vyasabha@sya_ they are identified in IV. 9. But vasana generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But sa@mskaras are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vasanas are innate sa@mskaras not acquired in this life. See _Vyasabha@sya, Tattvavais'aradi_ and _Yogavarttika_, II. 13.]
[Footnote 363: Tattavais'aradi and Yogavarttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumudi, I.]
[Footnote 364: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow {_du@hkhabahla@h sa@msarah heya@h_).]
[Footnote 365: The word _citta_ is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is the repository of all sub-conscious states. Samkhyn generally uses, the word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.]
[Footnote 366: Both Sa@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a _Kaivalya_ (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at this state puru@sa remains for ever alone without any association with buddhi, see _Sa@mkhya karika_, 68 and _Yoga sutras_, IV. 34.]
[Footnote 367: _Vyasabha@sya_ and _Tattvavais'aradi_, IV. 7.]
[Footnote 368: _Vyasabha@sya_ and _Tattvavais'aradi_, II. 3-9.]
[Footnote 369: Sa@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (_svata@h prama@nya@m svata@h aprama@nya@m_). The contribution of Sa@mkhya to the doctrine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vacaspati says on the subject has been borrowed from Vatsyayana such as the _purvavat, s'e@savat_ and _samanyatodr@s@ta_ types of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyaya or in the Tatparya@tika_ of Vacaspati. Sa@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of inference "_matranimittasa@myogivirodhisahacaribhi@h. Svasvamibadhyaghatadyai@h sa@mkhyana@m saptadhanuma_" (_Tatparya@tika_, p.
[Footnote 370: Sa@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds of sorrows, _adhyatmika_ (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind), _adhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by other men, beasts, etc.) and _adhidaivika_ (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (_puru@sartha_).]
[Footnote 371: See my "_Yoga Psychology_," _Quest_, October, 1921.]
[Footnote 372: Vacaspati, however, thinks that ananda and asmita have also two other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su.]
[Footnote 373: It should be noted that the word _samadhi_ cannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states.]
[Footnote 374: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the _Karika_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).]
[Footnote 375: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet the real nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic (maya):
"_Gunana@m parama@m rupam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati
Yattu d@rs@tipatham praptam tanmayeva sutucchakam._"
_Vyasabha@sya_, IV. 13.
The real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only by _prajna._]
[Footnote 376 _Apastamba,_ trans. by Buehler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and Bodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the Bombay Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]
[Footnote 377: Kalidasa's _Kumarasambhava "Udghato pra@navayasam nyayaistribhirudira@nam_," also Mallinatha's gloss on it.]
[Footnote 378: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian Philosophy," Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]
[Footnote 379: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which one is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhipsan jihasan va karma arabhate tenanena sarve pra@nina@h sarva@ni karma@ni sarvas'ca vidya@h vyapta@h tadas'rayas'ca nyaya@h pravarttate_ (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyaya). _Vatsyayana bhas'ya_, I.i. 1.]
[Footnote 380: Goldstuecker's _Pa@nini_, p. 157.]
[Footnote 381: _Caraka, S'arira_, 39.]
[Footnote 382: See the next section.]
[Footnote 383: Vatsyayana's Bha@sya on the _Nyaya sutras,_ I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in _Das'avaikalikaniryukti_ as noted before.]
[Footnote 384: _Nyaya sutra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'e@sika sutras_ IX. ii. 1-2,
[Footnote 385: Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha's article in _J.A.S.B._,
[Footnote 386: S'vetas'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 387: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalapa Vyakara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Ka@nada in his _Vais'e@sika sutras_, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himalaya).
"_Dnarma@m vyakhyatukamasya @sa@tpadarthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukamasya sagaragamanopamam_."]
[Footnote 388: The sutra "_Tadvacanad amnayasya prama@nyam_ (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskara_ as meaning "The Veda being the word of Is'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of Is'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sutra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]
[Footnote 389: The last two concluding sutras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upaskara_ (II. ii.
[Footnote 390: _Upaskara_ notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 391: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskara_), merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums. It must be noted that "_gu@na_" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Sa@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would be akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]
[Footnote 392: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See _Upaskara_ I.i. 22.]
[Footnote 393: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]
[Footnote 394: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.]
[Footnote 395: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]
[Footnote 396: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It should be noted that the word "_adravyatvena_" in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as "_adravyavattvena_."]
[Footnote 397: I have differed from _Upaskara_ in interpreting "_sa@mjnakarma_" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while _Upaskara_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upaskara's interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God.]
[Footnote 398: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's _Upaskara._]
[Footnote 399: In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 400: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nada was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.]
[Footnote 401: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskara_. I think the three sutras "_Sukhaduhkhajnananispattyavis'esadekatmyam," "vyavasthato nana,"_ and _"vastrasamarthyat ca"_ originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.]
[Footnote 402: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upaskara,_ which regards this sutra "_avidya_" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]
[Footnote 403: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of _udbhutarupavattva_ and _anudbhutarupavattva_. The word _samskara_ in Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection (_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome (_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upaskara_ IV. i. 7.]
[Footnote 404: This portion has been taken from the _Upaskara_ of S'ankara Mis'ra on the _Vais'e@sika sutras_ of Ka@nada. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual sense.]
[Footnote 405: I have differed from the _Upaskara_ in the interpretation of this sutra.]
[Footnote 406: _Upaskara_ here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sutras.]
[Footnote 407: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _pragabhava_ (negation before production), _dhvamsabhava_ (negation after destruction), and _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is _samanyabhava_ (general negation).]
[Footnote 408: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Nyaya sutras_, supplemented here and there with the views of Vatsyayana, the commentator. This follows the order of the sutras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyaya as possible. The general treatment of Nyaya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]
[Footnote 409: It is curious to notice that Vatsyayana says that an arya, a @r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an apta (reliable authority).]
[Footnote 410: Here I have followed Vatsyayana's meaning.]
[Footnote 411: Vatsyayana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 412: Vatsyayana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 413: I have followed Vatsyayana's interpretation here.]
[Footnote 414: _Yathapas'catsiddhena s'abdena purvasiddham atodyamanumiyate sadhyam ca atodyam sadhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyatodye svanata@h anumanam bhavatiti, vi@na vadyate ve@nu@h puryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na atodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tatha purvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam pas'catsiddhena upalabdhihetuna pratipadyate. Vatsyayana bha@sya,_ II. i. 15.]
[Footnote 415: Here the sutras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyaya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition of perception as given in the,_Nyaya sutra_, II. i. 4.]
[Footnote 416: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (avayavi). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.), _Avayavinirakara@na_ in _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_, may be referred to.]
[Footnote 417: _Purvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'ighrataram srotasa bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakas@thadivahanancopalabhamana@h pur@natvena, nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimatre@na. V@atsyayana bha@sya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].
[Footnote 418: According to Vatsyayana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.]
[Footnote 419: It is well to remember that Sa@mkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sa@mkhya-Yoga view represented in _Atreya-sa@mhita_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.]
[Footnote 420: _Nyaya sutra_ III. ii. 44.]
[Footnote 421: Vatsyayana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 422: A reference to the _Suvar@naprabhasa sutra_ shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvati (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
[Footnote 423: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (_anumana_) as _purvavat, s'e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta_.]
[Footnote 424: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]
[Footnote 425: The only old authority which knows these prama@nas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls _arthapatti arthaprapti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]
[Footnote 426: The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayana's commentary.]
[Footnote 427: The _Nyaya sutra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as "_samanaprasavatmika jati@h_" (II. ii. 71).]
[Footnote 428: Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha quotes a passage from _Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another passage from a Nyaya writer Bhasarvajna, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914, to show that the old Naiyayikas considered that there was an element of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the _Vais'e@sika sutras_, unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]
[Footnote 429: See Madhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulukyadars'ana_.]
[Footnote 430: The bha@sya of Pras'astapada can hardly he called a bha@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (_Padarthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma, samanya, vis'e@sa_ and _samavaya_ in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyaya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupaka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika sutras_ are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us after Ka@nada and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.]
[Footnote 431: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyaya was started in Mithila (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyaya studies. See Mr Cakravartti's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.]
[Footnote 432: _Is'varanumana_ of Raghunatha as well as his _Padarthatattvanirupa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions.]
[Footnote 433: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidyabhu@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]
[Footnote 434: Almost all the books on Nyaya and Vais'e@sika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyaya in Bengal," by Mr. Cakravartti in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]
[Footnote 435: I have treated Nyaya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.]
[Footnote 436: See _Nyayakandali_, pp. 59-64.]
[Footnote 437: See _Nyayakandali,_ pp. 64-66, and _Nyayamanjari_, pp.
[Footnote 438: _Abhava_ (negation) as dependent on bhava (position) is mentioned in the _Vais'e@sika sutras_. Later Nyaya writers such as Udayana include _abhava_ as a separate category, but S'ridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted by Pras'astapada as it was dependent on bhava--"_abhavasya prthaganupades'a@h bhavaparatantryat na tvabhavat_." _Nyayakandali_, p. 6, and _Lak@sa@navali_, p. 2.]
[Footnote 439: "_Tattvato jnate@su bahyadhyatmike@su vi@saye@su do@sadars'anat viraktasya samihaniv@rttau atmajnasya tadarthani karmanyakurvatah tatparityagasadhanani s'rutism@rtyuditani asa@nkalpitaphalani upadadanasya atmajnanamabhyasyata@h prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati paripakvatmajnanasyatyantikas'ariraviyogasya bhavat._" _Ibid._ p. 7.]
[Footnote 440: The reference is to Sautrantika Buddhism, "yo yo vruddhadhyasavan nasaveka@h." See Pa@n@ditas'oka's _Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts_.
[Footnote 441: The word "padartha" literally means denotations of words.]
[Footnote 442: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by Pras'astapada. Nyaya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara Mis'ra's _Upaskara_, VII. ii. 8.]
[Footnote 443 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in "parama@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The parima@n@dala parima@na is thus a variety of a@nuparima@na. The a@nuparima@na and the hrasvaparima@na represent the two dimensions of the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dirgha are with reference to trya@nukas. See _Nyayakandali_, p. 133.]
[Footnote 444: Pras'astapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sa@mskara becomes particularly strong. See _Nyayakandali_, p. 167. Ka@nada however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskara, memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]
[Footnote 445: Pras'astapada speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasamarthyam_). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (_samarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddha_), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras'astapada as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patanjali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a dharma which brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'ridhara refers to the Sa@mkhya-Yoga account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyayakandali_, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's _Nyayalilavati_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]
[Footnote 446: The Buddhist Panditas'oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Samanya is such, therefore samanya is non existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible--_Samanyadusanadikprasarita_--in _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a separate substance. So it discards jati. See _Vedantaparibhasa_, _Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabha_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's _Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]
[Footnote 447: Similarity (sadrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam_).]
[Footnote 448: The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sutrabha@sya II. ii. 13_) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavastha_). Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of _anavastha_--_prama@niki_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another _aprama@niki anavastha_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]
[Footnote 449: _Nyayamunjari_, p. 494.]
[Footnote 450: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
[Footnote 451: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
[Footnote 452: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_ on Buddhism. _Nyayamanjari Bha@sa-pariccheda_, with _Muktavali_ and _Dinakari_, and _Tarkas@mgraha_. The doctrine of Anyathasiddhi was systematically developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]
[Footnote 453: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later Nyaya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sutras of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter.]
[Footnote 454: See _Nyayakandali_, pp. 48-54.]
[Footnote 455: See Jayanta's _Nyayamanjari,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's _Kusumanjali_ with _Prakas'a_ and _Is'varanumana_ of Raghunatha.]
[Footnote 456: _Kadacit tribhirarabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadacit caturbhirarabhyate kadacit pancabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpana. Nyayakandali_, p. 32.]
[Footnote 457: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamh@ita_ I. 7.]
[Footnote 458: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191, _Nyayamanjari_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _Varttika_. There is very little indication in the Nyaya and _Vais'e@sika sutras_ that they had any of those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of these matters in the _Vais'e@sika sutras_ (VII. 1), the _Nyaya sutras_ are almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after Vatsyayana.]
[Footnote 459: See Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences,_ pp. 104-108, and _Nyayakandali_, pp. 33-34, "_S'arirarambhe paramanava eva kara@nam na s'ukra-s'onitasannipata@h kriyavibhagadinyayena tayorvinas'e sati utpannapakajai@h parama@nubhirarambhat, na ca s'ukras'onitaparama@nuna@m kas'cidvis'e@sa@h parthivatvavis'e@sat....Pitu@h s'ukra@m matuh s'onita@m tayos sannipatanantara@m ja@tharanalasambandhat s'ukra-s'onitarambhake@su parama@nu@su purvarupadivinas'e sama@nagu@nantarotpattau dvya@nukadikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrantahkara@napraves'o...tatra maturahararaso matraya sa@mkramate, ad@r@s@tavas'attatra punarja@tharanalasambandhat kalalarambhakaparama@nu@su kriyavibhagadinyayena kalalas'arire na@s@te samutpannapakajai@h kalalarambhakaparama@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'ad upajatakriyairaharaparama@nitbhi@h saha sambhuya s'arirantaramarakkyate."_.]
[Footnote 460: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]
[Footnote 461: Govardhana's _Nyayabodhini_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]
[Footnote 462: "_Avyabhicarinimasandigdharthopalabdhi@m vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava samagri prama@nam._" _Nyayamanjari_, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "prama@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: "_siddhamindriyadi, asiddhanca tatsannikar@sadi vyaparayannutpadayan kara@na eva caritartha@h kar@na@m tvindriyadi tatsannikar@sadi va nanyatra caritarthamiti sak@sadupalabdhaveva phale vyapriyate._" _Tatparya@tika_, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as prama@na which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. _"Pramat@rprameyayo@h. pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h. Pramat@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetu kathancit." Ibid._ p. 16.]
[Footnote 463: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 12-26.]
[Footnote 464: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacintama@ni_, K. Tarkavagis'a's edition, _Prama@nyavada_.
"The _Vais'e@sika sutras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a prama@na. The view that Vais'e@sika only admitted two prama@nas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, _"pratyak@sameka@mcarvaka@h ka@nadasugatau puna@h anumananca taccapi,_ etc." Pras'astapada divides all cognition (_buddhi_) as _vidya_ (right knowledge) and _avidya_ (ignorance). Under _avidya_ he counts _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or error), _anadhyavasaya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidya_) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (_ar@sa_). Interpreting the _Vais'e@sika sutras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. _Arthapatti_ (implication) and _anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upamana_ (analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]
[Footnote 465:
_Samagribhedai phalabhedacca prama@nabheda@h
Anye eva hi samagriphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h
Anye eva ca samagriphale s'abdopamanayo@h. Nyayamanjari_, p. 33.]
[Footnote 466: Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness (_pratyak@sasya sak@satkaritvam lak@sa@nam_).]
[Footnote 467:
_Na khalvatindriya s'aktirasmabhirupagamyate
yaya saha na karyyasya sambandhajnanasambhava@h.
Nyayamanjari_, p. 69.]
[Footnote 468:
_Sukhadi manasa buddhva kapitthadi ca cak@su@sa
tasya karanata tatra manasaivavagamyate...
...Sambandhagraha@nakale yattatkapitthadivi@sayamak@sajam
jnanam tadupadeyadijnanaphalamiti bha@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam
sukhasadhanatvajnanamupadeyajnanam.
_Nyayamanjari_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]
[Footnote 469: See Udyotakara's _Nyayavarttika_, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's _Tattvacintama@ni,_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]
[Footnote 470: "_Indriye@nalocya maricin uccavacamuccalato nirvikalpena g@rhitva pas'cattatropaghatado@sat viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhranto jayate tasmadvijnanasya uvabhicaro narthasya,_ Vacaspati's _Tatparyatika_," p. 87.]
[Footnote 471: _Nyayamanjari,_ p. 88.]
[Footnote 472: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]
[Footnote 473: _Ibid._ p. 184.]
[Footnote 474: _Nyayakandali,_ pp. 177-181, "_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na do@sasahakarina rajatasa@mskarasacivena sad@rs'yamanurundhata s'uktikavi@sayo rajatadhyavasaya@h k@rta@h._"]
[Footnote 475: _Tatparya@tika_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91, "_prathamamalocito'rtha@h samanyavis'e@savan._"]
[Footnote 476: _Ibid._ p.84, "_tasmadvyutpannasyapi namadheyasmara@naya purvame@sitavyo vinaiva namadheyamarthapratyaya@h._"]
[Footnote 477: _Nyayakandali,_p. 189 ff., "_ata@h savikalpakamicchata nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na samanyamatram g@rh@nati bhedasyapi pratibhasanat napi svalak@sa@namatram samanyakarasyapi sa@mvedanat vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhanacca, kintu samanya@m vis'e@sancobhayamapi g@rh@nati yadi paramida@m samanyamayam vis'e@sa@h ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantaranusandhanavirahat, pi@ndantaranuv@rttigraha@naddhi samanya@m vivicyate, vyav@rttigraha@nadvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h._"]
[Footnote 478: _Tattvacintama@ni_ p. 812.]
[Footnote 479: _Ibid_. p. 809.]
[Footnote 480: _Siddhantamuktavali_ on _Bha@sapariccheda karika_, 58.]
[Footnote 481: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 93-100, "_Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, gu@nakalpana, kriyakalpana, namakalpana dravyakalpana ceti, tas'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanat kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante._" See Dharmakirtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]
[Footnote 482: _Tatparya@tika_, pp. 88-95.]
[Footnote 483:_Siddhantamuktavali_ on _Karika_ 63 and 64. We must remember that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the _Nyaya sutra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle (_Tattvacintama@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
[Footnote 484: This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the _triputipratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), "_idamaha@m janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate taddhakendriyasannikar@sabhavat kintvida@mvi@sayakajnanatvavis'i@s@tasya jnanasya vais'i@styamatmani bhasate; na ca svaprakas'e vyavasaya tad@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m bhasitumarhati, purva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyajnanat, tasmadidamaha@m janamiti na vyavasaya@h kintu anuvyavasayah." _Tattvacintama@ni_, p. 795.]
[Footnote 485: It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mima@msa did. Eternality of sound meant with Mima@msa the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]
[Footnote 486: See _Nyayamanjari_ on anumana.]
[Footnote 487: See _Antarvyaptisamarthana,_ by Ratnakaras'anti in the _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]
[Footnote 488: See _Tatparya@tika_ on anumana and vyaptigraha.]
[Footnote 489: _Tatparya@tika_ on vyaptigraha, and _Tattvacintama@ni_ of Ga@nges'a on vyaptigraha.]
[Footnote 490: Dr Vidyabhu@sa@na says that "An example before the time of Dignaga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as "like a kitchen" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvadanuya@h sthalyadivat_, I.i. 36), but Pras'astapada has it in the proper form. Whether Pras'astapada borrowed it from Dig@nnaga or Dig@nnaga from Pras'astapada cannot be easily settled.]
[Footnote 491: Pras'astapada's bha@sya with _Nyayakandali_, pp. 200-255.]
[Footnote 492: _Karyyakara@nubhavadva svabhavadva niyamakat avinabhavaniyamo' dars'ananna na dars'anat. Tatparya@tika_, p. 105.]
[Footnote 493: Vatsyaya@na's bhasya, Udyotakara's _Varttika_ and _Tatparyya@tika,_ I.i. 5.]
[Footnote 494: See _Nyayamanjari_ on upamana. The oldest Nyaya view was that the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself "upamana." When Pras'astapada held that upamana should be treated as a case of testimony (_aptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vacaspati hold that it was not by the instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name "wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead us to this association called upamana. What Vatsyaya@na meant is not very clear, but Di@nnaga supposes that according to him the result of upamana was the knowledge of similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vacaspati of course holds that he has correctly interpreted Vatsyaya@na's intention. It is however definite that upamana means the associating of a name to a new object (_samakhyasambandhapratipattirupamanartha@h_, Vatsyaya@na). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astapada and _Nyayakandali,_ pp. 220-22, Vatsyaya@na, Udyotakara, Vacaspati and Jayanta on _Upamana_.]
[Footnote 495: See Kumarila's treatment of abhava in the _S'lokavarttika_, pp. 473-492.]
[Footnote 496: See _Nyayabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 53-7.]
[Footnote 497: See _Nyayabindu@tika_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 48-63.]
[Footnote 498 Pras'astapada says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence, S'ridbara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (_bhavavad abhavo'pindriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (_abhavendriyasannikar@so'pi abhavagraha@nasamagri_), Nyayakandali_, pp. 225-30.]
[Footnote 499: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]
[Footnote 500: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 586-659, and _Tarkikarak@sa_ of Varadaraja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinatha, pp. 185 ff.]
[Footnote 501:_Jnanasamavayanibandhanamevatmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 432 ff.]
[Footnote 502: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 190-204,_ Is'varanumana_ of Raghunatha S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusumanjali_.]
[Footnote 503: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 499-533.]
[Footnote 504: On the meanirg of the word Mima@msa see Chapter IV.]
[Footnote 505: Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada S'astri says, in his introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_, that "Kumarila preceded Sa@nkara by two generations."]
[Footnote 506: There is a story that Kumarila, not being able to convert Prabhakara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumarila's views or Prabhakara's. Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumarila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumarila's views were the right ones. Kumarila then rose up and said that Prabhakara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.]
[Footnote 507: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 160-173.]
[Footnote 508: See _Prakara@napancika_, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@nganatha Jha's _Prabhakaramima@msa_, pp. 35 etc.]
[Footnote 509: _S'lokavarttika_, see _Pratyak@sasutra_, 40 etc., and _Nyayaratnakara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection that Sa@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyaya that the senses actually went out to meet the objects (_prapyakaritva_) but held that there was a special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which the senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature of the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Parthasarathi objects to it as being almost a different category (_tattvantara_).]
[Footnote 510: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by S'ridhara.]
[Footnote 511: See _Prakara@napancika_ and _S'astradipika_.]
[Footnote 512: According to Sa@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (_samanyavis'esasamudayo dravyam, Vyasabhasya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together (_mrantara hi tadavayavah_), and it is this latter combination (_ayutasiddhavayava_) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Panditas'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (_paramanava eva hi pararupades'apariharenotpannah parasparasahita avabhasamana desavitanavanto bhavanti_). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless _(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it:
"_adustakaranodbhutamanavirbhutabadhakam
asandigdanca vijnanam katham mithyeti kathyate._"
_Nyayamanjari_, pp. 550 ff.]
[Footnote 513: See _Prabhakaramima@msa,_ by Dr Ga@nganatha Jha.]
[Footnote 514: _loc. cit._ pp. 26-28.]
[Footnote 515: See _Prakara@napancika, S'astradipika_, and _S'lokavarttika_, sutra 2.]
[Footnote 516: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila was indebted to Di@nnaga for this; for Di@nnaga's main contention is that "it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us no new knowledge see Vidyabhu@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and _Tatparya@tika_, p. 120.]
[Footnote 517: Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (_vyapti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.]
[Footnote 518: "_tasmadanavagate'pi sarvatranvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke bahus'ah sahityavagamamatradeva vyabhicaradars'anasanathadanumanotpattira@ngikartavya@h._" _Nyayaratnakara_, p. 288.]
[Footnote 519: See _S'lokavarttika, Nyayaratnakara, S'astradipika, Yuktisnehapura@ni, Siddhantacandrika_ on anumana.]
[Footnote 520: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (_upadhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say that it does not exist (_prayatnenanvi@syama@ne aupadhikatvanavagamat_, see _Prakara@napancika_, p. 71).]
[Footnote 521: See _Prakara@napancika_, pp. 113-115.]
[Footnote 522: According to Nyaya God created all words and associated them with their meanings.]
[Footnote 523: See _Prabhakaramima@msa_ by Dr Ga@nganatha Jha and S.N. Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mima@msa did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word manifestation. See Vacaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavarttika_ and _Prakara@napancika_. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see Sahkanatha's _Vakyarthamat@rkav@rtti_.]
[Footnote 524: See _S'lokavarttika_, atmavada _S'astra-dipika_, atmavada and mok@savada.]
[Footnote 525: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyaya Mima@msa did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of molecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy (_s'akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyaya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya) energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.]
[Footnote 526: See Dr Ga@nganatha Jha's _Prabhakaramima@msa_ and Madhava's _Nyayamalavistara_.]
[Footnote 527: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word "svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakirtti between ray esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakirtti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,--the object (or idea with Vijnanavadin) _from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated_, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? _The present_ and the present is a _k@sa@na_ i.e. nothing.... The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtana or simply sa@mtana and in every sa@mtana there is a synthesis ekibhava of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya = kalpana = adhyavasaya)...There is in the perception of a jug _something_ (a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the _idea_ of a jug (which is always a sa@mtana, always vikalpita), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains: k@sanasya jnanena prapayitumas'akyatvat. This is absolutely the Kantian teaching about _Synthesis of Apprehension_. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a _transcendental_ source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. This _prama@na_ is _asatkalpa_. Kant says that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa = kalpanapo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpana = buddhi = synthesis = ekibhava) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakirtti. He is a Vijnanavadi as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijnana) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bahya, it is artha, it is arthakriyak@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called Sautrantika and this school is sometimes called Sautranta-vijnanavada, as opposed to the Vijnanavada of As'vagho@sa and Aryasanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramarthasat, what would remain of Vijnanavada? But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddha kalpana), an element of reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakirtti has also _s'uddha kalpana_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ...And very interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumana, the first moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtana and the second from sa@mtana to k@sa@na, that is the reason that although bhranta the anumana is nevertheless prama@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the arthakriyak@sa@na. It is bhranta directly and prama@na indirectly; pratyak@sa is prama@na directly and bhranta (asatkalpa) indirectly... ." So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation (_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment) and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N.T., p. 20) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature? Dharmakirtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasyarthasya sannidhanasannidhanabkyam jnanapratibhasabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N., p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue" (_nilasarupa@m pratyak@samanubhuyamana@m nilabodharupamavasthapyate ... nilasarupyamasya prama@nam nilavikalpanarupa@m tvasya prama@naphalam_, N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue (_nilanirbhasa@m hi vijnanam_, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (_yatkincit arthasya sak@satkarijnanam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N.T. 7) and this is real (_paramarthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation is different from the idea "this is blue" (_nilabodha_, N.T. 22) which is the result of the former (_prama@naphala_) through the association of the affirmative process (_adhyavasaya_) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is a _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakirtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and vikalpapratyaya or pramanaphala is the idea or concept which follows it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasya prapayitumas'akyatvat_, N.T. 16). N.T. = _Nyayabindu@tika_, N = _Nyayabindu (Peterson's edition).]
[Footnote 528: See _Nyayamanjari_ on prama@na.]
[Footnote 529: Sa@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.]
[Footnote 530: See _Nyayaratnamala_, svata@h-prama@nya-nir@naya.]
[Footnote 531: See _Nyayamanjari_ on Prama@na, _S'lokavarttika_ on Pratyak@sa, and Gaga Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@tacintama@ni_ on Pratyak@sa.]
[Footnote 532: See Narasi@mhacarya's article in the _Indian Antiquary_,
[Footnote 533: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sutras_.]
[Footnote 534: "Brahmasutrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h" _Bhagavadgita_. The proofs in support of the view that the _Bhagavadgita_ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section on _Bhagavadgita_ and its philosophy.]
[Footnote 535: _Indian Antiquary_, 1915.]
[Footnote 536: See Vacaspati Mis'ra's _Bhamati_ on S'a@nkara's bhasya on _Brahma-sutra_, II. ii.]
[Footnote 537: S'a@nkara's bha@sya on Gau@dapada's karika, Anandas'rama edition, p. 214.]
[Footnote 538: Anandas'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bha@sya on Gau@dapada's karika, p. 21.]
[Footnote 539: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th century, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he did not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years. _J.R.A.S._ 1916.]
[Footnote 540: Compare _Lankavatara_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_.]
[Footnote 541: Gau@dapada's karika, IV. 2, 4.]
[Footnote 542: Gau@dapada's karika IV. 100. In my translation I have not followed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in Gau@dapada's karika. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gau@dapada's karikas seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapada's philosophy below.]
[Footnote 543: Compare in Nagarjuna's first karika the idea of _prapancopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpadamanucchedamas'as'vatam anekarthamananarthamanagamamanirgamam ya@h pratityasamutpadam prapancopas'amam s'ivam des'ayamava sambuddhastam vande vadatamvaram_. Compare also Nagarjuna's Chapter on _Nirva@naparik@sa, Purvopalambhopas'ama@h prapancopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words _prapancopas'aman s'ivam_.]
[Footnote 544: Compare Nagarjuna's k@arika, "anirodhamanutpadam" in _Madhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S._, p. 3.]
[Footnote 545: Compare _Madhyamikakarika, _B.T.S._, p.3 _anekartham ananartham_, etc.]
[Footnote 546: Compare _Lankavatarasutra_, p.78, _Advayasamsaraparinirva@nvatsarvadharma@h tasmat tarhi mahamate S'unyatanutpadadvayani@hsvabhavalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_; also 8,46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyanavabodhanat vijnananam svacittad@r@s@tyamatranavatare@na mahamate valaprthagjana@h bhavabhavasvabhavaparamarthad@r@s@tidvayvadino bhavanti_.]
[Footnote 547: Compare Nagarjuna's karika, _B.T.S._ p. 196, _Akas'am s'as'as'@r@nganca bandhyaya@h putra eva ca asantas'cabhivyajyante tathabhavena kalpana_, with Gau@dapada's karika, III. 28, _Asato mayaya janma tatvato naiva jayate bandhyaputro na tattvena mayaya vapi jayate_.]
[Footnote 548: The very name Alata@santi is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nagarjuna's karika, _B.T.S._, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the _S'ataka_.]
[Footnote 549: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, "Codanalak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.]
[Footnote 550: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bha@sya) on the ten Upani@sads (Is'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Ma@n@dukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, B@rhadara@nyaka, and Chandogya), and on the _Brahma-sutra_.]
[Footnote 551: See note on p. 432.]
[Footnote 552: S'a@nkara's bha@sya on the _Brahma-sutras_, I. iii. 19.]
[Footnote 553: S'a@nkara's commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen's _System of the Vedanta_.]
[Footnote 554: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the _Brahma-sutras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his _System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from the writings of his followers.]
[Footnote 555: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyatvanirukti_.]
[Footnote 556: See _Pancapadikavivara@na, Tattvadipana_, and _Advaitasiddhi_.]
[Footnote 557: According to Nyaya the _atman_ is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, _Nyayamanjari_ in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {_svaprakas'a_) says (p.432)
_sacetanas'cita yogattadyogena vina ja@da@h
narthavabhasadanyaddhi caitanya@m nama manma@he.]
[Footnote 558: See _Nyayamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]
[Footnote 559: See _Vedanta-paribha@sa_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]
[Footnote 560: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]
[Footnote 561: Dharmarajadhvarindra and his son Ramak@r@s@na worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedantic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedanta metaphysics. The early Vedantists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmarajadhvarindra he was largely indebted to the Mimam@sa school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamana s'abda and anupalabdhi also Dharmarajadhvarindra accepted the Mimam@sa view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarajadhvarindra, had also tacitly followed the Mimam@sa in these matters.]
[Footnote 562: Vedanta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, aha@mkara, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkara, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of ajnana as anta@hkara@na).]
[Footnote 563: Vedanta would have either pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyaya, viz. pratijna, hetu, udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]
[Footnote 564: Vedantic notions of the pramana of upamana, arthapatti, s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mimam@sa view, do not require to be treated here separately.]
[Footnote 565: See _Vedantaparibha@sa_ and _S'ikhama@ni._]
[Footnote 566: See _Vedantaparibha@sa, S'ikhama@ni, Ma@niprabha_ and Citsukha on svata@hprama@nya.]
[Footnote 567: See _Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha_ and _Nyayamakaranda_ on akhyati refutation.]
[Footnote 568: See _Vedantasara_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]
[Footnote 569:_Siddhantales'a_.]
[Footnote 570: See _Pancadas'i_.]
[Footnote 571: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyaya, _S'a@nkara-bha@sya_, II. ii.]