It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the _Brahma-sutras_ without making any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-sutras_ were first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 560]. There have been more than a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sutras_ who not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sutras and tothe Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the _Brahma-sutras_ were probably more faithful to the sutras than the interpretations of S'ankara.
The _S'rimadbhagavadgita_, which itself was a work of the Ekanti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the _Brahma-sutras_ as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 561]. Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sutras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in the _Brahma-sutras_ are not with regard to the Vijnana-vada of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'unyavada, but he regards the composition of the _Brahma-sutras_ to be later than Nagarjuna. I agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidyabhu@shana in holding that both the Yogacara system and the system of Nagarjuna evolved from the _Prajnaparamita_ [Footnote ref 562]. Nagarjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of S'unyavada; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavada are concerned I believe that the Tathata philosophy of As'vagho@sa and the philosophy of the _Prajnaparamita_ contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nagarjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the _Mahayana sutras_. Even in such later times as that of Vacaspati Mis'ra, we find him quoting a passage of the _S'alistambha sutra_ to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of pratityasamutpada [Footnote ref 563]. We could interpret any reference to S'unyavada as pointing to Nagarjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in the _Bhagavadgita_ to the _Brahma-sutras_ clearly points out a date prior to that of Nagarjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the _Bhagavadgita_ by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. The _Brahma-sutras_ could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadgita_.I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapada or S'a@nkara, and who interpreted the _Brahma-sutras_ in accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries on the _Brahma-sutras_, goes to show that the _Brahma-sutras_ were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that the _Bhagavadgita_, the canonical work of the Ekanti Vai@s@navas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gau@dapada who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent work as did Gau@dapada. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such Upani@sads as the S'vetas'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya was also the result of this dualistic development.
It seems that Badaraya@na, the writer of the _Brahma-sutras_, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator S'a@nkara. Gau@dapada seems to be the most important man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant that no other karikas on the Upani@sads were interpreted, except the _Man@dukyakarika_ by Gau@dapada, who did not himself make any reference to any other writer of the monistic school, not even Badaraya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession that the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered from the Vedas by Gau@dapada. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on Gau@dapada's karika, he says that "he adores by falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal gods [Footnote ref 564]." It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkara should credit Gau@dapada and not Badaraya@na with recovering the Upani@sad creed. Gau@dapada was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkara was a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapada [Footnote ref 565]. There is some dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 566], and suppose that in order to be able to teach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapada must have been living till at least 800 A.D.
Gau@dapada thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers As'vagho@sa, Nagarjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his karikas for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his karikas he says that he adores that great man (_dvipadam varam_) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances (_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 567]. He then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des'ita_) that the touch of untouch (_aspars'ayoga_--probably referring to Nirva@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction in it (_avivada@h aviruddhas'ca_). Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_jata_) is of non-existents (_abhutasya_); there are others who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being (_advayamajatim_). He agrees with those who hold that there is no coming into being [Footnote ref 568]. In IV. 19 of his karika he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way (_sarvatha Buddhairajati@h paridipita@h_).
Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuvadi_), who since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of origination (_jati_). In IV. 90 he refers to _agrayana_ which we know to be a name of _Mahayana_. Again, in IV. 98 and 99 he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leaders know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances (_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the karikas with an adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref 569].
Gau@dapada's work is divided into four chapters:
(i) Agama (scripture),
(2) Vaitathya (unreality),
(3) Advaita (unity),
(4) Alatas'anti (the extinction of the burning coal).
The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Ma@n@dukya Upani@sad by virtue of which the entire work is known as _Ma@n@dukyakarika_. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gau@dapada's work, not particularly connected with the Ma@n@dukya Upani@sad.
In the first chapter Gau@dapada begins with the three apparent manifestations of the self:
(1) as the experiencer of the external world while we are awake (_vis'va_ or _vais'vanara atma_),
(2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa atma_),
(3) as the experiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the _prajna_ when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure bliss (_ananda_).
He who knows these three as one is never attached to his experiences. Gau@dapada then enumerates some theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded as a creation from the pra@na (vital activity), others consider creation as an expansion (_vibhuti_) of that cause from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like dream (_svapna_) and magic (_maya_); others, that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord (_bhogartham_) or for his play only (_kri@dartham_), for such is the nature (_svabhava_) of the Lord, that he creates, but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.
Gau@dapada does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_), unrelationable (_avyavaharyam_), ungraspable (_agrahyam_), indefinable (_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_), the essence as oneness with the self (_ekatmapratyayasara_), as the extinction of the appearance (_prapancopas'ama_), the quiescent (_s'antam_), the good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_) [Footnote ref 570]. The world-appearance (_prapanca_) would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere maya (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (_paramarthata@h_). In the second chapter Gau@dapada says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a perceiver or soul (_jiva_) and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho, na cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 571]. Imagination finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the senseof unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_) is false; it is only the oneness (_advayata_) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nanedam...na p@rthag nap@rthak_) [Footnote ref 572]. The sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapancopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 573].
In the third chapter Gau@dapada says that truth is like the void(_akas'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from akas'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (_svapna_) and maya (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (_advaita_) by maya. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of maya upon it [Footnote ref 574]. One mind appears as many in the dream, as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything to be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajna_).
In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'anti, Gau@dapada furtherdescribes this final state [Footnote ref 575]. All the dharmas (appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote ref 576]. Gau@dapada then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nagarjuna. Gau@dapada continues thus: Those who regard kara@na (cause) as the karyya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause and effect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature (_svabhavatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience (_prajnapti_) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence ofproduction, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant (_mayahasti_) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (_vijnana_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (_avastutva_), the cessation (s'antam). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the movement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing (_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (_sa@msara_), but when that notion ceases there is no sa@msara. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing permanent (_s'as'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances (_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like maya, and that maya again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not so in reality (_para-martha_), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.
It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Madhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nagarjuna's karikas and the Vijnanavada doctrines, as found in _La@nkavatara_, that it is needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapada assimilated all the Buddhist S'unyavada and Vijnanavada teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapada took the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijnana or vacuity would hold good of the highest atman of the Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapada's views it was left for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.