We have already seen that the Mima@msists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathartha@h sarve vivadaspadibhuta@h pratyaya@h pratyayatvat_). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedanta objects to this, and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e. non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver), then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation, and negation with Mima@msa is nothing but the bare presence of the locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positiveconviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mima@msa position may be defined it fails [Footnote ref 594]. Vedanta thinks that the illusion is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects; the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion is generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas. The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidya (nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence of the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression of silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness (_sak@sicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations, one in the avidya states forming the illusory objective silver phenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state. But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena, their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of illusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacaniya-khyati_) illusory silver is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedanta, namely the _paramarthika_ or absolute, _vyavaharika_ or practical ordinary experience, and _pratibhasika,_ illusory. The first one represents the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due to do@sa. The difference between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is that the do@sa of the vyavaharika perception is neither discovered nor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of the pratibhasika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of our ordinary experience, and thus the pratibhasika experience lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavaharika. But just as the vyavaharika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications of the ajnana, as apart from our subjective experience and even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is also regarded as a modification of avidya, an undefinable creation of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in the case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver is created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is called the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacaniya_) silver of illusion. Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same but the avidya of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (_pari@nama_) on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation. The illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the point of view of the cit and pari@nama from the point of view of avidya, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nama is, that in the former the transformations have a different reality from the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it), while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same stuff as the avidya whose transformations it is). But now a difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to a coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified by do@sa and the object--cit as underlying the "this" before me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that "this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion "I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection with a previous v@rtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is" according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space, time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking stages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were causing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation) as distinguished from _badha_ (cessation). The illusory creation of dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa of sleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications in accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is called niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience it, whereas badha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective illusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable silver (_anirvacaniya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attribution of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion that it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyathakhyati_ form of illusion as advocated by Nyaya. Vedanta admits that when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion is of the form of anyathakhyati; but if one of the things is not present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not of the anyathakhyati type, but of the anirvacaniyakhyati type. Vedanta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous in all our experiences. The world appearance is an illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it is a misattribution (_anyathakhyati_) of the characteristic of the Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience, just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of silver its reality.