Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padartha_) we have already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 467]. Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _rupa_ (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat is applied, and this, S'ridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rupatva_ (colourness), and the rupa gu@na (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.
The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent (_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@saya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like rupa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.
The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Wateror air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.
The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and vayu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of akas'a. Had there been no akas'a there would have been no sound.
The sixth is sa@mkhya (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind (_apek@sabuddhi_); thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called apek@sabuddhi; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an indeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner [Footnote ref 468].
The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called _parima@n@dala parima@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and the _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_), for then the size (_parima@na_) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 469]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (sa@mkhya) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka) compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_) of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas of mahat parima@na makes things of still more mahat parima@na. The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dirgha (long) and this dirgha parima@na has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parima@na but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long (_dirgha_). Here we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation of "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dirgha_) parima@na, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parima@na of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if the atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas, then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparima@na, hrasva parima@na, mahat parima@na, and dirgha parima@na. The parima@na of akas'a, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parima@nas of the atoms, akas'a, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parima@nas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.
The eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.
The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.
The tenth is _vibhaga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na which destroys the connection or contact of things.
The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.
The other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness), _du@hkha_ (sorrow), _iccha_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and _yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.
The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness) belongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@mskara_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_ (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,
(2) _sthiti-sthapaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhavana_ is that quality of atman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref 470]. _Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 471]. _Adharma_ isthe opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.
_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,
(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.
_Samanya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called _samanya_ or _jati_, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or karma. This highest genus _satta_ (being) is called _parajati_ (highest universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajati (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or still more intermediate jatis such as _gotvajati_ (the genus cow), _nilatvajati_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as _pas'utva_ (animal jati) and _gotva_ (the cow jati); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.
This jati or _samanya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 472]. The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Samanya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref 473]. This jati is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 474].
Through _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and itis on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.
_Samavaya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 475].
These six things are called the six padarthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.